In this paper, a notion of risk measure is defined for dynamic models. Three axioms, coherence, relevance and dynamic consistence, are postulated. It is shown that every dynamic risk measure that satisfies the axioms can be represented as the maximal expected present value of future losses where expectations are taken with respect to a set of probability measures. As new information arrives, this set of probability measures is updated in the Bayesian way. Moreover, dynamic consistency implies that this set satisfies a certain consistency condition. † I would like to thank Peter Bank and Jacob Sagi for comments. Support by a Feodor Lynen Grant from Alexander von Humboldt foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
Introduction
Consider an institution that has settled on a certain way to measure the risk of its financial positions. As the trading day goes by, changes are made to the position and new information is being released. On the next morning, the institution wishes to reassess the risk of its changed position taking into account the new information in a proper way. A proper way is understood here as a rational way: it is important not to contradict oneself over time in one's risk assessments. The institution asks therefore: how should we process new information and how should we treat changes in the position?
Here, I present one possible way to answer this question by extending the path breaking work by Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) (ADEH in the sequel) on coherent risk measures to the multiperiod framework. To this end, I adapt the coherence axioms from ADEH to the dynamic framework. In addition, I impose dynamic consistency in the following sense. If two positions are assigned the same risk in all possible states of the world tomorrow, and no payments are due tomorrow for both positions, the two positions should have the same risk today. In particular, if in every future contingency, a position is acceptable, then it should be acceptable today. I show that these axioms lead to a representation of the form ρ t (D) = max
for a convex, closed set of probability measures (or generalized scenarios) P on the state space. The representation answers the question stated in the first paragraph. Changes in the position are to be taken into account by recalculating the (stochastic) present value of future payments. Information is processed via updating in a Bayesian way every single probability measure in the set of generalized scenarios P. The new risk of the position is given by the maximal expected present value of future losses where the expectation is taken under the updated probability measures. In addition, I show that consistency implies a certain closure property of the set P, which I call also consistency. Thus, as every set of probability measures qualifies as a possible choice for a coherent risk measure in the static framework, only consistent sets of probability measures yield dynamic coherent risk measures. A family of generalized scenarios is consistent if it can be constructed by a backward induction procedure. The procedure can be easily illustrated with a two period example. Say that, in the first period, the random variable X 1 is revealed, and in the second period, you learn the value of the random variable X 2 . Suppose that for every possible realization x 1 of X 1 in the first period, you have specified a conditional probability P x 1 for the second period random variable X 2 given that X 1 = x 1 . Moreover, assume that R is the (marginal) probability distribution of X 1 . Then one can derive the joint distribution of X 1 and X 2 by the formula for total probability (see formula (2) below). A set of scenarios P is consistent if the set is closed under arbitrary pasting together of conditional probabilities and marginal distributions from this set 1 . To my knowledge, this is the first paper to derive the equation (1) from a set of axioms. A different axiomatic approach can be found in Wang (2002) . The main difference is that Wang does not assume translation invariance; thus, the corresponding class of risk measures need not be coherent (nor convex). Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, Heath, and Ku (2002) adapt the static coherent risk measure axioms to an extended state space including states of nature and points in time to obtain a representation of the form
for one probability measure P and a set of positive increasing adapted processes A. Cvitanic and Karatzas (1999) assume that a complete financial market is given and define the risk of a position as the highest expected shortfall under some set of scenarios when the position is optimally hedged given a fixed initial capital.
The next section defines dynamic risk measures and exposes my set of axioms. Section 2 defines families of conditional generalized scenarios and the consistency property for these sets, and it contains the main representation result. An appendix gathers some proofs.
Dynamic Coherent Risk Measures
Consider a sequence of time periods t = 0, . . . , T, a finite set of states of the world Ω and a sequence of random variables X t : Ω → R, t = 0, . . . , T. X t is interpreted as the information revealed at time t. Accordingly, the corresponding information filtration is
is a (F t )-adapted process, to be interpreted as a sequence of random payments D t at time t. The set of all positions is denoted D. Throughout, r > −1 is a fixed, exogenous interest rate.
Given this general dynamic model, I propose the following definition for dynamic risk measures.
ρ t is translation invariant with respect to predictable income streams: let
Z be F t -measurable, set D(s, w) ∆ = Z(ω)1 {τ } (s) for some τ ≥ t. Then for all positions D and all ω ∈ Ω ρ t (D + D, ω) = ρ t (D , ω) − Z(ω) (1 + r) τ −t .
(predictable translation invariance)
Independence of the past and adaptedness are structural properties for dynamic risk measures. Past payments are sunk and should not influence the assessment how risky the remaining future payments are. Moreover, the risk measure should, of course, react to new information, but cannot depend on information to be revealed in the future; in other words, the dynamic risk measure has to be adapted. Monotonicity is certainly a reasonable requirement, whereas predictable translation invariance might need some explanation. Here is why I think that this property is reasonable. If one takes a risk measure as the amount of money required to make a position acceptable, then it is clear that after adding, say, 1000 $ to a position, the amount of money needed to make the position acceptable, is reduced by 1000 $. This is translation invariance. In the present dynamic setting, a position whose payments become known at a certain point in time t, carries no risk because it can be completely hedged by using suitable money market instruments at time t. Hence, adding a predictable position to a given position corresponds to adding the present value of the predictable position in t; thus, the risk of a given position should be reduced by the present value of the predictable position.
Throughout, I take a constant interest rate r > −1 as given. That is, the agent has a certain reference return r which he uses for calculating present values of deterministic income streams. I do think that such an interest rate exists in most relevant circumstances; in today's well developed markets, every individual, bank or regulatory agency has at least access to some kind of credit market with a predictable interest rate. Here, I assume for simplicity that the interest rate is not only predictable, but even constant. The main theorem is still valid, however, with stochastic interest rates as long as for every point in time discount factors (or zero coupon bonds) for all relevant maturities are available.
Axiom 1 A dynamic risk measure (ρ t ) is called coherent if every ρ t is homogeneous and subadditive: for all
Coherence says that mergers do not increase risk, yet mergers of identical positions do not reduce risk either. I follow ADEH in imposing coherence since this is definitely the aim of the present paper. Coherence implies convexity, and the latter is certainly economically meaningful, as it corresponds to the fact that diversification reduces risk. It might be tempting to assume only convexity as in Föllmer and Schied (2002a) . An extension to the dynamic framework under this weaker axiom is not attempted here and left to future work.
Axiom 2 A dynamic risk measure ρ is dynamically consistent iff whenever
Dynamic consistency as just defined states in particular that if a position leads to an uncertain payment in, say, December of 2004 (and only then), and I know that I will accept that position in November of 2004 whatever state of the world prevails, then I should accept that position also in 2003. I hope that the reader agrees with me that such consistency is desirable.
Finally, I introduce 
The preceding axiom extends the relevance axiom in ADEH to the dynamic framework. It states that every path which is not excluded by the known history is relevant in the sense that a possible loss on that path carries positive risk.
The Representation Theorem
As sets of (conditional) probability measures will play an important role, I introduce some relevant notation as well as the crucial consistency property for such sets before formulating the representation theorem. A history up to time t is given by a sequence ξ t = (x 1 , . . . , x t ) of realizations of X s , s = 1, . . . , t. The set of all histories up to time t is denoted H t = range ((X 1 , . . . , X t )). The empty history at time 0 is denoted ∅. The set of all possible continuations after some history ξ t is given by
∆(ξ t ) denotes the set of all probability measures on Ω(ξ t ). A probability measure on Ω(ξ t ) is to be interpreted as the conditional distribution of the random vector (X t+1 , . . . , X T ) given that (X 1 , . . . , X t ) = ξ t .
Definition 2 Assume that for all
is a closed and convex set of (conditional) probability measures. The collection Q ξt is called a family of conditional generalized scenarios. 
is consistent.
A family of generalized scenarios is consistent when it can be obtained by a backward induction procedure. The procedure can be easily illustrated with a two period example. Suppose that for every possible realization x 1 of the first period, you have specified a closed and convex set Q x 1 of conditional distributions for the second period random variable X 2 given that X 1 = x 1 . Moreover, assume that you have specified a closed and convex set R for possible marginal distributions of X 1 . Then, for every choice of conditionals Q x 1 ∈ Q x 1 and marginal distribution R ∈ R, one can derive the joint distribution of X 1 and X 2 by the formula of total probability (2). You obtain a consistent set of scenarios by pasting together conditionals of X 2 from (Q x 1 ) and marginals of X 1 from R in every possible way. After these preliminaries, the main representation theorem can be stated and proved. Recall that a set of probability measures P on a measurable space (A, A) has full support if the union of all supports in P is the whole set of states A. 
Before I prove this theorem, it is useful to collect two important properties of consistent families of probability measures in the next two lemmas. These are proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 4 1. A family of conditional generalized scenarios Q ξt is consistent if and only if for all ξ t ∈ H t and all random variables Z : Ω → R the recursive relation
min Q∈Q ξ t Ω(ξt) ZdQ = min Q∈Q ξ t Ω(ξt) min R∈Q (ξ t ,X t+1 (ω)) Ω(ξt,X t+1 (ω)) Z(ω )R(dω )Q(dω) (3) holds true.
A set of generalized scenarios P ⊂ ∆ is consistent iff for all random variables Z : Ω → R, one has
The preceding lemma shows that consistency of a family corresponds exactly to the usual logic of backward induction. If one first minimizes the conditional expectation of a random variable Z given a certain history x 1 and minimizes then the expected value of this function over all possible values x 1 , one obtains the same value as if one minimizes the expected value of the random variable ex ante.
Lemma 5 Assume that Q ξt is a consistent family of conditional generalized scenarios with full support. Then the family is determined by its initial set Q
∅ :
for all histories ξ t ∈ H t , t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
The full support assumption is needed here to ensure that the sets of conditional generalized scenarios are not empty for all histories. Consistency implies that the agent obtains the family of conditional generalized scenarios by updating every measure of the initial set of generalized scenarios that puts positive probability on the given history.
After these preliminary considerations, the proof of the main theorem can be given. Proof of Theorem 3 : Let us start with the easier implication from (2.) to (1.). All properties are either obvious or well known from Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) except dynamic consistency. So let D, D ∈ D be given and fix some t. By predictable translation invariance, one can assume without loss of generality that
for all ω. From this and D t = D t = 0, one gets
Let us now consider the more difficult implication (1.) to (2.).
Step 1: Expansion of the state space. Fix a time period t and a history ξ t ∈ H t . Define the expanded state space S(ξ t ) ∆ = {t, . . . , T } × Ω(ξ t ) and endow this space with the σ-field O(ξ t ) generated by all D ∈ D restricted to S(ξ t ). Denote by D(ξ t ) the set of these restricted positions. By Definition 1,1. and 1,2. (independence of the past and adaptedness), the mapping
is well-defined and independent of ω. σ inherits monotonicity, subadditivity, and homogeneity from ρ t . Translation invariance takes here the following form. The mapping D α ≡ α ∈ R corresponds to a sure payment of α in every period. Therefore, by iterated application of the axiom of translation invariance,
. Then σ is a coherent risk measure on the space (S(ξ t ), O(ξ t )) with interest rate R(t). The ADEH theorem (in the version stated in the Appendix) yields a convex and closed set M of probability measures on (S(ξ t ), O(ξ t )) with
Step 2: The next step is to show that the marginal distribution m ({τ } × Ω(ξ t )) is uniquely determined. To this end, fix τ ∈ {t, . . . , T } and consider the position that yields a certain payment of 1 at time τ :
On the other hand, from (4), it follows that σ(
(dω|s) .
Step 3: The set of conditional distributions P|τ ∆ = {m(·|τ ) : m ∈ M} does not depend on τ . This follows from predictable translation invariance and dynamic consistency, as I now show. Let Z : Ω → R be a random variable that is known at time
for all ω ∈ Ω. By dynamic consistency, one obtains ρ t (D, ω) = 0 for all ω, and thus σ(D) = 0, or
Since this holds true for all F τ -measurable random variables Z, it follows (perhaps invoking a separation argument, see also Appendix B) that
. Therefore, the conditional distributions can all be obtained from the conditional distribution at time T . Setting
Note that P(ξ t ) inherits closedness and convexity from M. Moreover, from the Relevance Axiom, one gets immediately that P(ξ t ) has full support.
Last step: Show that (P(ξ t )) is consistent. Let Z be a random variable, and set
By Lemma 4, consistency follows. This concludes the proof. 2
The above theorem shows that every dynamic coherent risk measure corresponds to a choice of a convex, closed, and consistent set P of generalized scenarios with full support. Two trivial examples of such sets are the whole set, P = ∆, corresponding to the worst case risk measure, and the 'Bayesian' risk measure, where P consists of a single probability measure with full support. On the other hand, the theorem shows also that Value at Risk as well as the dynamically consistent version of Value at Risk in Wang (2002) are not (dynamically) coherent risk measures. For practical applications, the question arises how to construct appropriate sets of scenarios. In principle, there are two general methods. The first one uses backward induction and is suggested by the definition of consistency itself. I illustrate this method for the case of two periods, T = 2. One starts by specifying closed and convex sets Q x 1 ⊂ ∆(x 1 ) for every history x 1 in the first period. These are possible conditional distributions of the random variable X 2 given a certain value of X 1 = x 1 . One chooses then a set of possible marginal distributions for the random variable X 1 , say R. The consistent set of probability measures P is then constructed by setting P ∆ = Q X 1 R. A second method uses the fact that the intersection of consistent sets is itself consistent. Therefore, for a given set of scenarios P one can pass to the consistent hull of P, the smallest consistent set containing P. The corresponding risk measure is then dynamically consistent.
I conclude the paper with a remark on dynamic consistency and backward induction or dynamic programming. As the reader recognizes easily from the proof, or directly from Lemma 4, a dynamic coherent risk measure satisfies the recursive relation
This equation greatly simplifies the analysis of dynamic optimization problems related to dynamic risk measures and is also of importance for numerical implementations since it allows to calculate dynamic risks via backward induction. Moreover, one derives easily from this equation that the process
(1 + r) −s D s is a supermartingale for all P ∈ P. This will provide interesting connections with the theory of hedging and pricing of financial derivatives as future work will show.
A The ADEH Theorem
In the proof of the representation theorem, I use the following version of the ADEH theorem. This may seem stronger than the ADEH theorem as I replace the supremum by the maximum and the (arbitrary) set of probability measures by its convex closure here. But as the reader easily checks, there is no loss of generality in doing so. A proof is given by Föllmer and Schied (2002b) , Corollary 14.
B Proof of the Lemmas
In the proof of the lemmas, I will use the following fact which is an immediate consequence of the separation theorem for convex sets: 
ZdQ .
Moreover, I shall need the following lemma. 
Proof :
From the formula of total probability (2), closedness follows immediately. For convexity, take, for simplicity, t = 1, and choose Q 0 , Q 1 ∈ Q X 1 Q and 0 < λ < 1. One has to show that Q 2
Set Q 2
Since 0 < µ(x 1 ) < 1 and Q x 1 is convex,
The following calculation shows that Q 2 = R X 1 2 Q 2 , and hence Q 2 ∈ Q X 1 Q. ∈ arg min R∈Q x 1 Ω(x 1 ) Z(ω )R(dω ), and choose Q ∈ arg min Q∈Q Ω min R∈Q X 1 (ω) Ω(X 1 (ω)) Z(ω )R(dω )Q(dω). Then
Therefore, K = L, and the proof is complete. 2
Proof of Lemma 5 : I show the claim for the initial step from Q to Q x 1 . Induction does the rest. By consistency, every Q ∈ Q can be written as
for suitable R x 1 ∈ Q x 1 and R ∈ Q. Assume Q(X 1 = x 1 ) > 0. From (2), it follows that
and thus {Q (·|X 1 = x 1 ) : Q ∈ Q, Q(X 1 = x 1 , . . . , X t = x t ) > 0} ⊂ Q x 1 .
On the other hand, let Q x 1 ∈ Q x 1 be given. For every other possible realization y 1 = x 1 choose Q y 1 ∈ Q y 1 . By the full support assumption, there is R ∈ Q with R(X 1 = x 1 ) > 0. SetQ(A) = Q x 1 (A ∩ {X 1 = x 1 })R(X 1 = x 1 ) + y 1 =x 1 Q y 1 (A ∩ {X 1 = y 1 })R(X 1 = y 1 ). By consistency, Q ∈ Q and, by construction, Q x 1 =Q (·|X 1 = x 1 ). This shows that Q x 1 ∈ {Q(·|X 1 = x 1 , . . . , X t = x t ) : Q ∈ Q, Q(X 1 = x 1 , . . . , X t = x t ) > 0}.
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